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COMMENT

Creating a Modern Atlantis: Recognizing
Submerging States and Their People
JESSICA L. NOTO†
INTRODUCTION
“Men argue, nature acts.”

1

Low-lying islands and coastal regions throughout the
world are in imminent danger of encroaching seawater
because of global warming. This will inevitably result in the
loss of territory, life, and, in certain cases, international
recognition of entire states. In fact, as many as one billion
people may be negatively impacted by rising sea levels in
the coming years,2 with almost two million displaced from
small island nations by 2050.3 The United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has predicted

† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2014, SUNY Buffalo Law School. Special thanks to
my 2012-13 Jessup teammates (Henry Zomerfeld, John Land, Michael Das, Esq.
and Jonathan Dominik, Esq.) and coaches (Kevin Espinosa, Esq., and Michael
Hecker, Esq.) for their help and guidance throughout the process; to my editor,
Emily Dinsmore, for her hard work on finalizing this piece; and to my family for
their unending love and support.
1. VOLTAIRE, DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE 428 (Raymond Naves ed.,
Garnier Frères 1961) (1765).
2. Walter Kälin, Conceptualizing Climate-Induced Displacement, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT 81, 81 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010).
3. ELIZABETH FERRIS ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., ON THE FRONT LINE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: LEARNING FROM AND WITH PACIFIC ISLAND
COUNTRIES 19 (2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/
files/reports/2011/9/idp%20climate%20change/09_idp_climate_change.pdf.
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a minimum of a 7.1-inch rise in sea level by the end of the
century.4
These rising sea levels will devastate small island
nations. States such as Tuvalu, Fiji, and the Maldives have
already been forced to seek new homelands elsewhere.5 Fiji
is currently in negotiations to establish a lease or cessation
of land from Australia, while Tuvalu has begun a mass
evacuation of its people.6 Further, the Maldivian president
has openly discussed relocating his entire state, as most of
the state’s 1,200 islands are merely 4.9 feet above sea level.7
He has also contracted with Dutch engineers to create
artificial lands anchored to the seabed, which would have
the capacity to float above the rising sea level.8 Yet, current
international law does not provide jurisdictional sovereignty
for artificial lands, including islands.9 An island built within
two hundred miles of a coastal state, a zone commonly
referred to as the exclusive economic zone, would be bound
by the jurisdiction of that state over its initial construction
and continued existence.10 Accordingly, climate change and
global warming are problems that are moving to the
forefront of the international community’s agenda and need
to be addressed to protect the citizens of the world.
While the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
admits that “[s]ea-level rise poses by far the greatest threat
4. Sinking Island’s Nationals Seek New Home, CNN WORLD (Nov. 11, 2008,
8:53 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-11-11/world/maldives.president_1_sealevels-maldivian-climate-change?_s=PM:WORLD [hereinafter Sinking].
5. Ilan Kelman, Island Evacuation, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Oct. 2008, at
20, 20-21.
6. See id.
7. See Sinking, supra note 4.
8. Katharine Gammon, Building Artificial Islands that Rise with the Sea,
POPULAR SCI. (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/201207/building-artificial-islands-rise-sea.
9. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 60(8), opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter
UNCLOS]; Rosemary Rayfuse & Emily Crawford, Climate Change, Sovereignty
and Statehood 11 (Sydney Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11/59,
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1931466.
10. UNCLOS, supra note 9, art. 60(2); Rayfuse & Crawford, supra note 9.
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to small island states relative to other countries,”11 rising
sea levels will not just impact those states. In Bangladesh,
over one hundred million people live within a few meters of
sea level.12 If sea levels continue to rise at the current rate,
these people will be without a home and will be forced to
flee inland or seek sanctuary elsewhere. Certain coastal
areas in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America will lose
hundreds of miles of coastline.13 Specifically, New Orleans
will all but disappear permanently,14 which could cause
widespread panic and mass evacuations. This is further
evidence of the unique and devastating position many of
these people face in the coming years due to climate change
and rising sea levels.
As currently codified, international law is woefully
insufficient to combat the growing concerns of climate
change. Adopted in 1994, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) was the first
formal recognition of global climate change as a cause for
concern in the international community.15 This convention,
as well as its Kyoto Protocol addendum, underlies the
current understanding of climate change in the
international community. The UNFCCC attempts to compel
the stabilization of greenhouse gases in a timeframe that
will not cause permanent damage to ecosystems globally.16
The Alliance of Small Island States impacted the adoption
11. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Small Island
States, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 843,
847 (2001), available at http://ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg2/index.php?idp=621.
12. David Hodgkinson et al., ‘The Hour When the Ship Comes in’: A
Convention for Persons Displaced by Climate Change, 36 MONASH U. L. REV. 69,
69-70 (2010) (Austl.).
13. J.L. Weiss & J.T. Overpeck, Rising Temperatures, Disappearing
Coastlines, NPR (Dec. 8, 2009, 9:59 AM) http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=121197147.
14. Id.
15. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, G.A. Res.
48/189, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/189 (Jan. 20, 1994).
16. Id.; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1,
37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
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of the UNFCCC and marked the first time that these
geographically diverse island states were able to convince
the United Nations that their plight was one that needed to
be discussed in an open forum.17 To date, there are no other
United Nations documents that address the impact of
climate change on the global community as a whole, or what
preventative steps should be taken to avoid the impending
devastation.
The impact of global sea level rise raises two key issues.
International law is currently ill-equipped to classify: (1) the
disappearing states; and (2) their citizens. First, there is the
issue of granting statehood recognition. Currently, there are
only two theoretical frameworks for recognizing statehood:
the Declarative Theory and the Constitutive Theory.18 These
competing theories require very different criteria for
granting statehood recognition. However, both theories
concern granting a new state recognition rather than
addressing a state maintaining its recognition once it has
already been established. There are currently no theories
that codify the requirements for maintaining statehood
status. In situations where a state no longer qualifies as a
state under the two current theories, either temporarily or
permanently, the issue of continuing international
recognition arises. Without recognition, the state could no
longer act on behalf of its people in an international stage.
The loss of statehood recognition is a concern for many
reasons. For example, the Statute of the International
Court of Justice requires parties to be states before they can
bring a claim before the court.19 If states no longer qualify
under the traditional Declarative or Constitutive Theories
of statehood, then they may be foreclosed from bringing
claims before the International Court of Justice and other
international courts. Moreover, if those people are

17. John W. Ashe et al., The Role of the Alliance of Small Island States
(AOSIS) in the Negotiation of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCC), 23 NAT. RESOURCES F. 209, 209-11, 219 (1999).
18. See discussion infra Part I.
19. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, reprinted in 1947
I.C.J. Acts & Docs No. 6, at 71 (June 26).
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mistreated by other nations, their home state will have no
means of protecting them if it loses recognition.
The second issue that arises from global sea level rise is
status recognition for the affected peoples. The
international community affords different levels of
protection in different situations. A strict reading of the
most cited, and only, United Nations document addressing
refugee status does not protect persons displaced beyond
their state’s borders who are fleeing environmental
devastation.20 Even regional treaties and conventions do not
specifically address this issue. The common definition of the
term “refugee” includes “events seriously disturbing public
order,”21 but no international court has interpreted
environmental damage to qualify. There are circumstances
in which environmentally affected people may be protected
as internally displaced persons22 or as stateless23 persons,
but the most appropriate level of protection would be as a
refugee.
Addressing these concerns will require expanding, and
possibly overturning, current codified international law. At
a minimum, it will require the international community to
think about these growing concerns in a new light. At most,
it will require a radical shift in the way the international
community is held accountable for its actions.

20. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Introductory Note, Jan.
31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
21. See, e.g., id.; Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa art. I.2, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001
U.N.T.S. 45; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the
International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama
art. III.3, Nov. 22, 1984, http://www.unhcr.org/45dc19084.html [hereinafter
Cartagena Declaration].
22. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa, arts. 4.2, 5.4, adopted on Oct. 23, 2009, 49 I.L.M.
83, 89, 90 [hereinafter Kampala Convention].
23. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989
U.N.T.S. 175.
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I. STATEHOOD RECOGNITION
Statehood recognition is viewed in the international
community through two different lenses. The first is
retention of statehood recognition. However, there are no
formalized standards against which a state can be
measured to determine whether it retains its statehood.24
So, while the idea of continuity of a state would be best
suited for the context of states lost to rising sea levels, it
does not provide an objective measure upon which a state
can be judged.
The initial recognition of states is the second lens
through which statehood is viewed. This view has two
primary theories: the Declarative Theory and the
Constitutive Theory. Historically, there is evidence of states
being recognized for the first time, whereas there is little
evidence about why states have retained their statehood.
Additionally, since a state has yet to lose its recognition due
to rising sea levels, it is difficult to predict which method
would be employed. Thus, each method must be analyzed
and evaluated for appropriateness and applicability.
A. Continuity of Statehood
State practice indicates a continued “trend in
international law suggest[ing] a strong presumption in
favor of the prevention of statelessness.”25 While rising sea
levels may threaten to completely submerge low-lying
islands and coastal regions, “there is a general presumption
of continuity of statehood . . . [and] statehood is not lost
automatically with the loss of habitable territory nor is it
necessarily affected by population movements.”26 Even
24. See discussion infra Part 1.C. While the Declarative and Constitutive
Theories describe how new states can be formed, they are silent on the retention
of statehood.
25. Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions and Statelessness: The Emerging
Right to an Effective Nationality Under International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1141, 1183 (1998).
26. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Summary of Deliberations on
Climate Change and Displacement, ¶ 30 (Apr. 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/
4da2b5e19.pdf.
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international treaties evidence a strong preference toward
the prevention of statelessness. For example, the 2006
European Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in
Relation to State Succession provides that it is each state’s
responsibility to prevent international statelessness.27 This
obligates states in the international community to not strip
a state’s right to existence.28
The United Nations has also been ardent in promoting
the reduction of statelessness. Article 8 of the United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
provides that a state should not promote or continue a
policy of depriving “a person of its nationality if such
deprivation would render him stateless.”29 Accordingly,
states may not deny a citizen his nationality unless he is
able to obtain new citizenship.30 The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees has also advocated for the
international community to avoid creating stateless
persons.31 Preventing statelessness has been viewed as a
monumental right similar to the right to nationality.32
The international communities’ fervent desire to
prevent statelessness indicates that if a state did lose its
territory to rising sea levels, the international community
would not want to strip that state of its statehood, nor its
peoples of their nationality. However, this idea of statehood
continuity has no methods by which a state can be tested.
Thus, it is far more likely the international community
27. See Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in
Relation to State Succession, arts. 3, 6, opened for signature May 19, 2006,
C.E.T.S. No. 200 (entered into force Jan. 5, 2009), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?CL=ENG&CM=
1&NT=200.
28. See id.
29. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 23, art. 8, at
179.
30. Id. art. 7, at 178.
31. Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Rep. on its 46th Sess.,
¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/860 (Oct. 23, 1995).
32. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Climate Change and Statelessness: An
Overview, 2 (May 15, 2009), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/smsn/igo/
048.pdf [hereinafter Climate Change and Statelessness].
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would look to one of the two methods used to recognize new
states, even if these theories were ill-suited to application in
the context of maintaining statehood recognition.
B. Recognition of New States
There are two active theories regarding emergence of
newly recognized states. The first is the traditional and
formally codified Declarative Theory. The second is the
more recently developed Constitutive Theory. As neither
theory has been used appropriately in the context of
maintaining recognition nor granting lost recognition on
their own, both theories are ill-suited to application in the
context of submerging states that had previously been
granted recognition. However, in combination, both theories
help lay the foundation for a more appropriate test for
states that are facing total environmental devastation.
1. Declarative Theory
The Declarative Theory was first codified in 1933 within
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of
States (“Montevideo Convention”).33 This theory of statehood
recognition is the most widely applied, recognized, and cited
source in international law for determining statehood.34 The
Declarative Theory proposes four factors for granting
statehood recognition: a defined territory, an effective
government, a permanent population, and the capacity to
enter into relations with other states.35 According to the
International Court of Justice’s former president Rosalyn
Higgins, these “component elements have always been
interpreted and applied flexibly, depending on the

33. See Milena Sterio, A Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory of
Statehood, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 209, 215-16 (2011).
34. See Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention
and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 413-14 (1999).
35. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933) [hereinafter Montevideo
Convention].
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circumstances and the context in which the claim of
statehood is made.”36
Application of the Declarative Theory is generally
supported by state practice in instances where states are
being recognized for the first time. Moreover, international,
regional, and domestic bodies have consistently defined
statehood using the Declarative Theory.37 For example, the
dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in 1991 led to the emergence of five successor states:
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.38 The Arbitration
Commission charged with determining the status of the
successor states applied the Declarative Theory when it
declared the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be a state
without regard to its status in the international
community.39 Moreover, this commission also set dates for
recognition of all five successor states, which predated
informal international recognition by months or years.40
Bosnia-Herzegovina was accepted by both the United States
and the European Community as a state even though it was
only formally recognized by Bulgaria and Turkey.41 In this
instance, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia were
recognized by the United States because they met all four
factors outlined in the Montevideo Convention, not because
they were recognized by other states.42 Since the Declarative
Theory is more widely acknowledged and used, it has been

36. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW
WE USE IT 39 (1994).
37. Stefan Talmon, The Constitutive Versus The Declaratory Theory of
Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?, 75 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 101, 106-07 (2004).
38. Roland Rich, Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union, 4 EURO. J. INT’L. L. 36, 36 (1993).
39. See id. at 48-49; Talmon, supra note 37, at 107.
40. See International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Documentation of
the Arbitration Commission Under the UN/EC (Geneva) Conference: Advisory
Opinion No. 11 [Dates of Succession], ¶ 10, July 16, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1586;
Talmon, supra note 37, at 107.
41. Rich, supra note 38, at 50.
42. See id.
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improperly applied in the context of maintaining
submerging states’ recognition.
a. Defined Territory. Of the four Declarative Theory
factors, a defined territory is widely considered to be the
most important.43 Without a defined territory, there is no
place for the permanent population to reside or the effective
government to control. The International Court of Justice
has even recognized exercising control over territory to the
exclusion of others as a necessity for statehood recognition.44
That same court had previously held that “respect for
territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of
international relations.”45 Many states agree with this
principle. For example, the United States requires “effective
control over a clearly defined territory” for it to consider an
entity a state.46 Additionally, distinguished scholars have
long considered effective and exclusive control over land a
requirement for statehood. James Crawford, a leading
international law scholar, even went so far as to say that
“the right to be a State is dependent . . . upon the exercise of
full governmental powers with respect to some area of
territory.”47
The United Nations has considered the plight of lowlying coastal regions. In doing so, the United Nations
General Assembly determined that the “very existence” of
these states is threatened by rising sea levels.48 The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has found that
43. See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928).
44. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶
19 (Feb. 20).
45. Corfu Channel (Gr. Brit. & N. Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9).
46. U.S. Dep’t of State, Press Relations Office Notice (Nov. 1, 1976),
Diplomatic Relations and Recognition, 1976 DIGEST ch. 2, § 3, at 19-20, quoted in
Eleanor C. McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 337, 337 (1977).
47. James Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood in International Law, 48
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 93, 111 (1977) [hereinafter Crawford, The Criteria for
Statehood].
48. G.A. Res. 63/213, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/213 (Dec. 19, 2008)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 63].
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submerged states cease to exist.49 Following this logic, states
will lose their claim to statehood if territory is lost or
rendered uninhabitable. Therefore, it is clear that the
United Nations requires a state to maintain a defined
territory for continued recognition of statehood.
To address this concern, states may have to resort to
preemptively leasing or purchasing land from other states
so as not to disappear off the map entirely. Historically,
states are not voluntarily willing to cede territory.
Therefore, it is more likely that states will be forced to lease
new homelands. However, a tenant state is necessarily
reliant on a landlord state to maintain its territory.50 For
example, if the landlord state breaks the lease, the tenant
will have no territory and its people would be rendered de
facto stateless. Thus, the tenant state cannot be said to have
exclusive control over the leased territory. Leases, by their
very nature, indicate a temporary solution for loss of
territory, rather than a permanent one.51 As this would be a
first for the international community, it remains to be seen
whether leased land would actually satisfy the territory
requirement.
However, allowing use of temporary locations as defined
territory, for the purposes of statehood under the
Declarative Theory, undermines the requirement’s
significance. In his defense of Israel’s statehood before the
United Nations Security Council, Phillip C. Jessup
indicated the defined territory factor is satisfied only when
there is “some portion of the earth’s surface which [the
state’s] people inhabit and over which [the state’s]
Government exercises authority.”52 Allowing a state to
retain its statehood, even upon a state’s forced relocation of
its people after multiple lease expirations, undermines the
intentions of the defined territory requirement for
49. See Climate Change and Statelessness, supra note 32, at 2.
50. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-11 (7th
ed. 2008). Brownlie notes that these arrangements necessarily depend on
“precise terms of the grant,” but that there is “a presumption that the grantor
retains residual sovereignty.” Id.
51. See Climate Change and Statelessness, supra note 32, at 2.
52. U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 383d mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.383 (Dec. 2, 1948).
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statehood. Thus, to maintain the integrity of the territorial
requirement of statehood, the defined territory requirement
of the Declarative Theory necessitates a permanent
homeland for states whose territory has been rendered
completely uninhabitable because of rising sea levels.
b. Effective Government. A state having complete
sovereignty and not having to rely on another state is the
central purpose of recognition. One of the essential
requirements for independence is an effective government.53
James Crawford even went so far as to say that “[t]he
requirement that a putative [s]tate have an effective
government might be regarded as central to its claim for
statehood.”54 Thus, the inherent ability of a state to create
and use laws to govern its own territory is fundamental to
those principles of independence, and by association,
statehood.55 Ownership of property is one way to ensure the
ability of a state to have exclusive control over its own
territory.
However, an effective government is not purely derived
from mere ownership of property. Rather, an effective
government is satisfied by maintaining specific control over
the territory of which it controls: “[t]erritorial sovereignty is
not ownership of but governing power with respect to
territory.”56 A government must be able to exercise control
over its territory and be “capable of establishing and
maintaining a legal order throughout the territory of the
prospective [s]tate.”57 Inherent in dictating the laws of a
territory is maintaining territorial jurisdiction, so a state is
able to adjudicate violators of the controlling state’s
domestic laws. In contemplating the concept of a leased
state, scholars have noted that territorial jurisdiction is only
lost if it is expressly waived by the landlord state.58 Thus, it
53. See Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood, supra note 47, at 116.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 116-19.
56. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (2d
ed. 2006).
57. DAVID RAI , STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 63 (2002).
58. See BROWNLIE, supra note 50, at 110-11.
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is possible for a leased state to maintain territorial
jurisdiction over a territory, and subsequently, an effective
government over that territory. However, pure ownership of
a territory, with complete sovereignty over its people and its
laws, still would clearly satisfy the effective government
requirement.
Historically, even when a state with little or no
governmental control over its community applied for
statehood, it has been granted. For example, the Republic of
Congo was first accepted into the United Nations in 1960,
even when it did not have an effective government.59 During
this time, there was a divide in the Republic of the Congo as
to which of two governmental factors should retain control
of the territory. Additionally, it was plagued by a number of
cessionary movements.60 In fact, the Republic of Congo was
so volatile that United Nations forces had to intervene to
prevent a civil war.61 James Crawford even said, in respect
to the Republic of the Congo, that a “less . . . effective
government would be hard to imagine”62 because of the
extent to which the government was in turmoil. While it is
true that mere acceptance into the United Nations in 1960
alone does not signify the Republic of the Congo’s
statehood,63 despite all of the internal governmental control
issues and concerns, it was still considered a state during
this time.
Entering into a contract, treaty, or agreement with
another state necessarily relinquishes some of that state’s
rights. However, in cases where a state has ceded some of
its rights to another state, that has not prevented, or
revoked, its statehood. Currently, the United States has
three free associated states: the Marshall Islands, the
59. CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 57.
60. Id. at 56.
61. Id. at 57.
62. Id. at 57.
63. As the United Nations notes on its website, it “does not possess any
authority to recognize either a State or a Government.” About UN Membership,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/about.shtml (last visited Mar.
17, 2014).
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Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau. All three of
these states are members of the United Nations and are
considered sovereign.64 Moreover, these states have retained
full statehood status since gaining independence. However,
the defense of all three of these states is governed by United
States laws, treaties, and custom.65 Additionally, the
citizens of these states are able to enter the United States,
take up residency, and work without any of the bureaucracy
that other non-citizens would be forced to endure before
being allowed to take any of those actions.66 In this case,
these citizens are able to have the full rights and
protections of a United States citizen without having United
States citizenship. In another case, the state of Andorra is
partially governed by France.67 Andorra has two princes
that reign over its people; however only one of them is
elected by the people and the other is appointed by France.68
Yet, Andorra remains a state.69 Furthermore, the
Philippines retained its statehood even while it was a
protectorate of the United States.70 Thus, this factor for
statehood recognition is also interpreted very loosely by the
international community.
c. Permanent Population. The effective control of a
permanently defined territory is meaningless if there is no
64. Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, U.S. Relations with Marshall Island,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26551.htm
[hereinafter Marshall Islands]; Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, U.S.
Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 3,
2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm [hereinafter Micronesia];
Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, U.S. Relations with Palau, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1840.htm [hereinafter
Palau].
65. Marshall Islands, supra note 64; Micronesia, supra note 64; Palau, supra
note 64.
66. Marshall Islands, supra note 64; Micronesia, supra note 64; Palau, supra
note 64.
67. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Relations with Andorra,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3164.htm.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Bureau of E. Asian & Pac. Affairs, U.S. Relations with the Philippines,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26551.htm.
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permanent population to govern and protect. For “[i]f
[s]tates are territorial entities, they are also aggregates of
individuals. A permanent population is thus necessary for
statehood.”71 A dispersed population is still permanent as
“[t]here are already a large number of Pacific countries with
very large populations outside their territory and this does
not affect their ability to continue to function as States.”72
While at first it might seem that this factor is narrow, it
too is broadly defined. The International Court of Justice
held in the Western Sahara advisory opinion that a
permanent population does not need to be stationary or at
rest for a minimum amount of time.73 In its holding, the
court found that a transitory or dispersed population is still
considered permanent.74 State practice also indicates that a
permanent population has no size requirement. As one law
review article indicates, “infinitesimal smallness has never
been seen as a reason to deny self-determination to a
population.”75 For instance, Kiribati Island is a small state
that contains less than 100,000 citizens,76 but it still has full
member status at the United Nations.77 Another example is
Tuvalu, which is the world’s smallest state as it has a
population of only approximately 10,000.78 Despite its size,
Tuvalu is still recognized and uniformly accepted as a
state79 and member of the United Nations.80 Thus, there are
71. Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood, supra note 47, at 114.
72. JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 131-32 (2012).
73. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39, at ¶ 81 (Oct.
16).
74. Id. (finding the tribes of the Western Sahara to be permanent due to their
social and politically organization, even though they were nomadic).
75. Thomas M. Franck & Paul Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in
Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 331, 383 (1976).
76. GOV’T OF KIRIBATI, NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAM
http://unfcc.int/resource/docs/napa/kir01.pdf.

OF

ACTION 1 (2007),

77. MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/
members/index.shtml (last visited Feb 15, 2014) [hereinafter MEMBER STATES].
78. GOV’T OF TUVALU, TUVALU’S NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMME OF ACTION
6 (2007), http://www.sids2014.org/content/documents/162NAPA.pdf.
79. Id.

762

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

no location or size requirements necessary to satisfy the
permanent population factor under the Declarative Theory.
While population remains a necessary factor, it too has been
broadly construed.
d. Entering into International Relations. The final
factor, the capacity to enter into relations with other states,
must be viewed through the lenses of both sovereignty and
independence.81 Merely having the capacity to execute an
agreement with a foreign state does not satisfy this
requirement of statehood, unless that agreement is one of
independence.82 The Island of Palmas arbitration defined
the ideas of sovereignty and independence as a state’s
ability to exercise its functions within its own territory to
the exclusion of other states.83
This factor also requires states to be able to initiate
negotiations (not just agree to proposals with other states)
since the “capacity to enter into the full range of
international relations . . . is independent of its recognition
by other States and of its exercise by the entity concerned.”84
This ability “depends partly on the power of internal
government of a territory”85 to dialogue with the
international community.
Under the Declarative Theory, a defined territory,
effective government, permanent population, and the
capacity to enter into relations with other states are
necessary factors used to determine statehood. Grants of
statehood recognition are not easily satisfied by these four
requirements, despite the factors’ flexibility in application.
Moreover, as the most widely applied, recognized, and
acknowledged theory of statehood, the Declarative Theory
might be the method employed if a state were to ever
succumb to the threats of sea level rise and had yet to locate
80. MEMBER STATES, supra note 77.
81. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928).
82. Crawford, The Criteria for Statehood, supra note 47, at 119.
83. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 838.
84. CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 61.
85. Id. at 62.
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a new and permanent homeland for its people. However,
this is not the only theory of statehood. The Constitutive
Theory is another method by which statehood could be
granted and it can be viewed as an expansion of the
capacity to enter into relations with other states factor of
the Declarative Theory to the exclusion of the other factors.
2. Constitutive Theory
Under the Constitutive Theory, statehood can be
achieved only when other states recognize the entity which
seeks to become a state. As the noted international scholar
Stefan Talmon explains, “only recognition makes a State a
State, and thus a subject of international law. . . . ‘[a] state
is, and becomes, an International Person through
recognition only and exclusively.’”86 Having the capacity to
enter into international relations with other states indicates
recognition because “states cannot exist in a vacuum, and if
no other state wishes to engage in international relations
with a particular entity, that entity will never become a
fully sovereign partner on the international scene.”87
Therefore, a state exists when other international bodies
recognize its existence.88 Under this theory, “it is the
acquiescence or resistance of the international community—
whether or not guided by normative considerations such as
the integrity of the peace and security scheme—that
determines whether these events are permitted to affect a
state’s legal status.”89
However, merely being granted statehood status by the
United Nations does not indicate, in a practical sense, that
86. Talmon, supra note 37, at 102 (quoting 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A TREATISE 125 (8th ed. 1955)).
87. Sterio, supra note 33, at 216.
88. See Brad R. Roth, The Entity that Dare Not Speak Its Name:
Unrecognized Taiwan as a Right-Bearer in the International Legal Order, 4 E.
ASIA L. REV. 91, 107 (2009).
89. Id. at 106; see also JORRI DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES: SELF-DETERMINATION AND
STATEHOOD 138-39 (1996) (discussing how the recent admission of microstates to
the United Nations demonstrates continued constitutive effects).
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a state has been granted statehood. The United Nations
even indicates that grants of statehood by that organization
do not necessarily indicate when an entity has become a
state.90 Moreover, countries do not lose membership from
falling into arrears.91 This is evidenced by the fact that as of
2013, roughly twenty-five percent of United Nations
member states have failed to pay their membership dues in
full, but retain their position in the General Assembly.92
C. These Theories Are Ill-Suited for this Context
1. The Declarative Theory is Not Applicable
The Montevideo Convention does not indicate how a
state can maintain its statehood once it is obtained, but
instead, merely defines the basic factors93 that should be
included for a state to be initially granted recognition: “[t]o
be sure, the Montevideo Convention was concerned with
whether an entity became a state, not with how an entity
might cease to be a state.”94 Indeed, Article 6 of the
Montevideo
Convention
itself
makes
clear
that
“[r]ecognition is unconditional and irrevocable.”95 While it is
true that the Montevideo Convention is only one codification
of the Declarative Theory, which existed before the
convention, the creators of the convention expressly
acknowledge the lack of appropriate application in this type
of a context where a state wants to remain a state.
90. See U.N. Charter art. 4; About UN Membership, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/members/about.shtml (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
91. U.N. Charter art. 19 (noting a member may still vote despite outstanding
dues if there is a reasonable explanation for nonpayment).
92. Committee on Contributions, Contributions Received for 2014 for the
United Nations Regular Budget, http://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/
honourroll.shtml (last visited on Feb. 5, 2014); see also Barbara Crossette, Even
Its Allies Castigate U.S. Over Failure to Pay U.N. Dues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1995, at A3 (discussing the one billion dollars the U.S. owed in U.N.
membership fees).
93. CRAWFORD, supra note 56, at 45-46.
94. Grant, supra note 34, at 435.
95. Montevideo Convention, supra note 35, at art. 6.
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Moreover, satisfying the Declarative Theory factors do
not guarantee statehood, as it is inconsistently applied.
Meeting these factors does not necessitate recognition, as it
only “reflects political convenience more than it embodies
doctrinal coherence.”96 For example, “[i]f statehood were an
‘objective’ matter and recognition merely ‘declaratory,’ the
case for Taiwan’s statehood would be overwhelming.”97
Taiwan meets all four factors of the Declarative Theory: it
has a defined territory, diplomatic relations with other
states, a permanent population of nearly 25 million citizens,
and held a seat at the United Nations for over two decades.98
However, the international community refuses to
acknowledge Taiwan as a state for political reasons.
Acknowledging Taiwan would question China’s claim to
Taiwan’s territory, and because of this political pressure,
rather than an actual reason based on one of the four
factors provided in the Declarative Theory, the
international community refuses to grant Taiwan statehood
status.99 States “are obligated to take care not to act in ways
that contradict the central government’s claim of
sovereignty over the territory in question.”100 However, in
the case of Taiwan, the international community has failed
to recognize its claim for sovereignty over its territory.101
Moreover, according to the Montevideo Convention, an
entity must “occupy a clearly defined territory” to be
recognized as a state.102 However, when this factor is
practically applied, it indicates that territory is not
“necessary to statehood, at least after statehood has been
firmly established.”103 This is because it “appears to be the
case that once an entity has established itself in
96. Roth, supra note 88, at 94.
97. Id. at 93-94,98.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 103.
100. Id. at 111.
101. Id. at 103.
102. Grant, supra note 34, at 414; see Montevideo Convention, supra note 35,
at art. 1.
103. Grant, supra note 34, at 435.
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international society as a state, it does not lose statehood by
losing its territory.”104 For example, the Polish, Yugoslav,
Czechoslovak, and Baltic States all retained statehood
recognition despite losing territorial power.105 Further,
shifting borders have never been viewed as a bar to
statehood recognition, as “there is . . . no rule that the land
frontiers of a state must be fully delimited and defined.”106
For example, Israel’s borders have been in dispute since its
inception, but it remains a recognized state in the
international community.107
Like the requirement for a defined territory, the
effective government requirement is not equitably applied.
As previously mentioned, the United States has three freely
associated states: Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the
Federated States of Micronesia.108 All three of these states
are recognized internationally as sovereign states, and they
even hold seats at the United Nations.109 However, all three
of these states have derogated certain rights to the United
States, namely defense.110 These states have also derogated
some of their rights to immigration as United States
citizens and citizens of these states can enter each other’s
territory with a lower standard than that of other nations.111
Thus, the necessity for a state’s government to have full and
effective control over its territory is not necessary for
statehood to be maintained.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. North Sea Continental Shelf, (Ger./Den. v. Ger./Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
20).
107. S.C. Res. 1397, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1397 (Mar. 12, 2002). Other states have
faced similar concerns, yet they have been recognized as well. See S.C. Res.
1583, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1583 (Jan. 28, 2005) (Leb.); JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, ET. AL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 115 (3d ed. 2010) (Fin.).
108. Marshall Islands, supra note 64; Micronesia, supra note 64; Palau, supra
note 64.
109. MEMBER STATES, supra note 77.
110. Marshall Islands, supra note 64; Micronesia, supra note 64; Palau, supra
note 64.
111. Marshall Islands, supra note 64; Micronesia, supra note 64; Palau, supra
note 64.
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The Declarative Theory is clearly ill-suited for
application in the context of rising sea levels. One of the
main concerns of the low-lying islands and coastal regions is
a loss of territory. However, this theory is inconsistently
applied in general, especially with respect to whether a
defined territory is actually a necessity to be considered a
state. Moreover, the case of Taiwan indicates that this
theory can be easily swayed by political pressures. This
means that it may not be the most objective test. Thus, the
Declarative Theory should not be the method applied to
states which are addressing the retention of statehood
recognition.
2. The Constitutive Theory Also Should Not Be Applied
Alone
The Constitutive Theory holds that recognition is the
only and exclusive means to statehood, which is a “matter
within states’ discretion.”112 This theory of statehood is a
minority position that is not supported by state practice,
and only by a small number of scholars.113 In fact, it has
never been formally applied by an international court or
organization when dealing with the issues of statehood
recognition. The prevailing view is that “recognition is
merely acknowledgement of the existing statehood
status.”114 Moreover, according to the Declarative Theory,
even “the act of recognition does not confer status.”115
Recent history has shown that the Constitutive Theory
is not supported by state practice. Again, Slovenia, Croatia,
Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia were all recognized by the Arbitration
Commission tasked with determining their recognition
status, and by civilized nations, before they were ever

112. Talmon, supra note 33, at 102 (quoting 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 125, ¶ 71 (8th ed. 1955)).
113. Id. at 105.
114. William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the State in
State Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 115, 118 (2009).
115. Id.
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recognized internationally.116 Thus, while this theory is
recognized by scholars it has never been formally applied,
which impacts its credibility as a viable method for
application in this or any other context. Moreover, when it
has been discussed, it has only been as a method by which
new states are recognized in the international community.
D. What Should Be Applied?
Currently, it is very difficult to predict what the
international community will deem is the most appropriate
test when determining continuity of statehood. However,
the most logical conclusion would combine the strengths of
these two theories. While at first glance it may appear as
though the capacity to enter into relations with other states
is equivalent to the international recognition of states by
the community, those two points are distinct. Further, the
international community should use the foundations of the
four Declarative Theory factors and expand them to include
the Constitutive Theory as the fifth, and most important, of
those factors. Upon combination, the four factors of the
Declarative Theory should be applied very loosely, with the
requirement of a defined territory used as more of a
suggestion rather than a requirement.
One of the major strengths of the Declarative Theory, as
codified in the Montevideo Convention, is that it provides an
objective method by which to measure recognition, whereas
one of the major weaknesses of the Constitutive Theory is
that there is no way to know when a state has been
recognized. By enveloping the Constitutive Theory into the
Declarative Theory, the importance of recognition can be
emphasized into more tangible factors.
The capacity to enter into relations with other states is
distinct from being recognized internationally. Cyprus is a
prime example of the distinction between these two criteria.
Cyprus is a territory that meets all of the Declarative
Theory requirements, even the capacity to enter into
relations with other states, but is not itself considered a
state. There is clearly defined territory on Greece which is
116. Talmon, supra note 37, at 106-07.
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recognized as Cyprus.117 There is a population on that
territory that has been able to successfully enter into
contracts with other territories. Cyprus also has an effective
government that protects the territory and its people.
However, Cyprus has not been recognized as a state by the
international community for political reasons.118 Thus, it is
made clear through the examples of Cyprus and Taiwan119
that meeting the capacity to enter into relations with other
states factor of the Declarative Theory is not the same as
being recognized internationally. If this element was added
to the Declarative Theory, then it would add more validity
and credibility to that theory because it would provide a
reason as to why these two territories are not currently
recognized as states.
By adding this additional factor to the Declarative
Theory, a mere loss of defined territory would not
necessarily preclude states that may temporarily have no
homeland because their states have been permanently
submerged by the rising sea levels.
Combining these two theories would not only highlight
each theory’s strength, but also minimize the weaknesses.
For example, one of the weaknesses of the Constitutive
Theory is that it is necessarily reliant on the whims and
wills of states to determine how and in what manner a
territory becomes a state. However, as an addition to the
Declarative Theory, this would no longer be an issue
because the other four factors of that theory would temper
that weakness. Further, the Declarative Theory is weak
because it has very little state practice and few signatories,
117. Cyprus remains a popular tourist destination, as is shown by the plethora
of resources available for those who wish to visit. See, e.g., Introducing Cyprus,
LONELY PLANET, http://www.lonelyplanet.com/cyprus (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
118. While Cyprus is a member of the United Nations, Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, and World Trade Organization, “[t]he United States does not recognize
[Cyprus’s statehood], nor does any country other than Turkey.” Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Relations with Cyprus, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5376.htm.
119. See Roth, supra note 88, at 96-99 (arguing Taiwan meets all four factors
of the traditional Declarative Theory but is still not recognized as a state).
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and it is sometimes criticized for this weakness. However,
the addition of the Constitutive Theory would help to
alleviate some of those concerns, as the Constitutive Theory
is not codified in a single document and is evidenced by
many examples of state practice. Forcing the governing
bodies to look at not only how the territory is viewed in the
community as a whole, but also by more tangible standards,
combines the flexible strength of the Constitutive Theory
with the objective qualities of the Declarative Theory.
Thus, the strongest and most applicable method for
statehood recognition in the context of lost territory due to
rising sea levels would be to combine the two most popular
theories.
II. STATUS CLASSIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS
Statehood classification is not the only status
classification that will impact states and their people when
affected by rising sea levels. The way in which international
law and custom classifies and, subsequently treats, these
people is also of great import. There are currently many
different classifications that could be bestowed on the
displaced people of these states.
If the states are fortunate enough to not be rendered
completely uninhabitable, then it is possible that the
displaced people could be given Internally Displaced Person
status.120 However, in the case of rising sea levels impacting
small island nations, this classification is unlikely.
Other classification options for displaced persons
include: refugee as defined within the traditional 1951
Refugee Convention; refugee as expanded by state practice
to include environmental refugees; or possibly even
stateless persons. The most reasonable of these categories
for use in this context would be that of environmental
refugee. However, as this is not currently a legitimate or
legal category in international law on its own, the refugee
definition needs to be expanded from the 1951 Convention.
120. See Kampala Convention, supra note 22 (defining internally displaced
persons).
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First, these people could potentially satisfy the
definition of refugee under the traditional convention.
Historically, under the Refugee Convention of 1951, a
refugee is one who has a: “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of . . . membership [in] a particular
social group, . . . is outside the country of his nationality[,]
and is unable to avail himself of the protection of that
country,” or if he does not have a nationality or is unable to
return to that country.121 Persecution is defined as “the
infliction of harm or suffering by government,”122 and a
social group is one whose members share some common
experience.123
To be a refugee under the Refugee Convention, an
individual must have a reasonable fear of persecution by his
or her government based on one of five defining
characteristics: race; religion; nationality; membership of a
particular social group; or political opinion.124 Persecution is
a “principal element” required to classify an individual as a
refugee and is “interpreted strictly to mean an act of
government against individuals.”125 State practice and
application of this definition demonstrates that the
reasonable fear of persecution must be attributable to a
particular state’s action, traditionally, of that refugee’s own
government.

121. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
122. Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 997 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Al
Khalili v. Holder, 557 F.3d 429, 437 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
123. Denissenko v. Haskett, (Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 26 May
1996) (Austl.); Recent Development, Asylum for Persecuted Social Groups: A
Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar—Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir.
1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 913, 922 (1987).
124. Refugee Convention, supra note 121, art. 1.
125. Jessica B. Cooper, Comment, Environmental Refugees, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.
J. 480, 482 (1998).
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Excessive carbon emissions from well-developed states
are the chief cause of sea level rise.126 Under a very
restrictive plain reading of this convention, it would be very
difficult for a state to prove that there was a single
government act against individuals with respect to the issue
of climate change. This is particularly true because the
worst carbon emitters are well-developed states, such as the
United States, China, and India. Thus, it would be nearly
impossible for people from underdeveloped small island
states to demonstrate any reasonable fear of persecution
from their own government. Moreover, it would also be
difficult, if not impossible, to attribute specific climate
change events that negatively impacted a state to another
nation’s actions directly. Carbon emissions have no
“tagging” type qualities that would allow tracing back to a
state of origin. Therefore, under a strict interpretation of
the traditional definition of refugee, the analysis might
necessarily stop before determining if these people would
meet any of the five factors to attain such a status.
One possible way to overcome the failures in the
traditional definition is to expand the requirement from
persecution by the government of a refugee’s nationality to
governments on a more global scale. Despite knowing of the
harmful negative affect it has on other states globally, many
governments continue to fund projects that increase carbon
emissions. These states do nothing to stop the harmful
emissions that its industry produces, and are knowingly
causing the environmental degradation that is permanently
destroying entire regions of the world.127 It is possible to
view the people displaced by global warming as fitting the
persecution requirement if it is expanded to include those
people who are being persecuted not by one specific
government, but rather, by many on a global scale. If it is
determined that persecution by the world’s governments is
an acceptable way to view this requirement, then these
environmental migrants might fit at least one of the criteria
126. See Report of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Climate
Change
2007
Synthesis
Report
(2007),
http://ipcc.ch/publications_
and_data/ar4/syr/en/main.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
127. See id. (describing the effects of climate change on coastal regions).
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necessary for achieving a refugee status under the
traditional formulation of refugee in the 1951 Refugee
Convention.
Formulating the governmental persecution requirement
in this way also helps alleviate the concern about fearing
return to the state of their persecution. If it is found that a
refugee’s home government does not need to be the
persecuting entity, these displaced persons would be able to
return to their home country without first losing their
refugee status protection. This would allow more people to
be helped, and treated, in a way that is more appropriate to
their situation. By allowing this expanded interpretation of
the government requirement, these people would still have
the requisite fear necessary to be a refugee. However, this
fear would not be directed at their home country, which in
turn, would not bar them the opportunity to return to it if it
resurfaced or was again rendered habitable.
Next, the people displaced by the negative effects of
climate change may also fit the social group criteria for
recognition as a refugee under the traditional definition.
These people are suffering the harm of being temporarily or
permanently displaced because of their membership in two
distinct social groups: (1) the group of people with
insufficient political power to protect their environment
from the predations of other governments; and possibly (2)
the group of small island nations who are particularly
susceptible to the dangers of sea level rise. Thus, these
environmental migrants would, and should, be viewed as
refugees under a plain reading of the 1951 Convention.
Even if the international community does not find
qualifying these people as refugees under the traditional
definition persuasive, state practice has expanded that
traditional definition of refugee. The expanded definition
includes those who flee their homeland as a result of events
seriously disturbing the public order,128 especially when they
fear for their life.129 Specifically, the Organization of African
128. Cartagena Declaration, supra note 21, at art. III.3.
129. Organization of African Unity, Convention Governing the Specific Aspects
of Refugee Problems in Africa art. 1, ¶ 2 Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
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Unity (“OAU”) expanded the definition of refugee out of
necessity due to the mass diaspora of the African peoples
because of famine, drought, war, and instability of the
governments.130 The 1969 OAU Convention included an
addition for classifying refugees as also applying to “every
person who, owing to external aggression, occupation,
foreign domination or events seriously disturbing the public
order in either part of the whole of his country of origin or
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual
residence . . . .”131 Additionally, the Cartegena Declaration
addresses the refugee crisis in Central America and also
includes the expansion of the refugee definition to the
events that seriously disrupt the public order.132
Both of these conventions have specifically made
mention of frequent natural disasters causing the expansion
of their respective regional conventions and treaties to
include those persons displaced by those disasters. Again,
states have expanded the definition to include those fleeing
natural disasters133 as nearly a billion people may soon be
displaced by the negative effects of climate change.134
Persons displaced by climate change may find themselves
deprived of a home, and subjected to deprivations of their
nationality135 and basic human rights.136 They may not only
fear returning home, but may be unable to, and therefore

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Cartagena Declaration, supra note 21, at art. III, ¶ 3.
133. Kampala Convention, supra note 22.
134. Walter Kalin, Conceptualizing Climate Change Induced Displacement, in
CLIMATE CHANGE & DISPLACEMENT 81 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010); Comm’n of the
Eur. Cmtys., Green Paper from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of Regions: Adapting to Climate Change in Europe, Options for EU Action, COM
(2007) 354 final (June 29, 2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0354:EN:NOT.
135. See discussion supra Part I. (arguing for statehood).
136. See discussion infra Part III. (arguing that human rights obligations
should extend to the environmentally affected).
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deserve heightened protections as refugees.137 Natural
disasters clearly satisfy the necessary requirement of an
event that “seriously disturbs the public order.” Thus, those
who fear for their lives and are now displaced, and even
possibly those who have been rendered stateless, would
satisfy the expanded definitions found in the OAU
Convention or the Cartagena Declaration. Accordingly,
these people are refugees under the modern definitions
because the natural disaster that overtook their territory
threatened their life, and they fled due to that disaster.138
State practice further demonstrates that those fleeing
environmental disasters should be afforded heightened
protections. The United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs contends that those displaced by
natural disasters are entitled to heightened protections
because they are “among the most vulnerable of the human
family.”139 The Operational Guidelines on Human Rights
and
Natural
Disasters
outlines
protections
for
140
environmental migrants.
Both the International
Organization for Migration and the European Union grant
heightened protections for environmental refugees.141
Moreover, if these inundated states lose statehood, then
the displaced people will have been rendered de facto
stateless142 as they necessarily would lack a nationality, and
137. Roger Zetter, Protecting People Displaced by Climate Change: Some
Conceptual Challenges, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT 131, 131 (Jane
McAdam ed., 2010).
138. See discussion supra Part II.
139. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11,
1998).
140. BROOKINGS-BERN PROJECT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, BROOKINGS INST.,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATURAL DISASTERS: OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES AND FIELD
MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN SITUATIONS OF NATURAL DISASTER pt.
II, at 17-18 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/
files/reports/2008/5/spring%20natural%20disasters/Spring_natural_disasters.
141. Int’l Org. for Migration, Migration and the Environment, MC/INF/288
(Nov. 1, 2007); see Council Directive 2001/55 on Minimum Standards for Giving
Temporary Protection in the Event of Mass Influx of Displaced Persons art. 2,
2001 O.J. (L 212).
142. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.a.
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would be unable to return to their previous country,
rendering them refugees by the Refugee Convention’s plain
meaning.143 Thus, it is very important that states be
afforded some type of recognition, even in the event of a loss
of a large quantity of territory.144 Without this recognition,
surrounding states will be inundated with people who have
no nationality. This indicates that these people are, and
should be, viewed as stateless under a plain reading of the
Refugee Convention, even if they might otherwise qualify
for additional protection under a different convention.145
Additionally, some select individual states have also
enacted statutes to provide additional protections. The
United States grants such individuals “Temporary
Protected Status.”146 The United States recently granted
this status to those displaced by the earthquake in Haiti.147
Similarly, Sweden and Finland have enacted statutes
affording temporary protection to those fleeing natural
disasters.148 However, at this current time it is neither
obligatory nor mandatory to provide these temporary
protective measures. But, as there is no set minimum
limitation on the number of states required to create state
practice, there may enough evidence to support an
argument that it is current state practice to provide such
statuses to those affected by natural disasters.
It is true, however, that an environmental refugee is not
a status recognized by international law,149 and where such
143. Refugee Convention, supra note 121, at art. 1.A.2.
144. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.a.
145. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Stateless Persons
Convention).
146. 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1)(A) (2012).
147. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, TEMPORARY PROTECTED
STATUS EXTENDED FOR HAITIANS (Oct. 1, 2012) available at http://www.uscis.gov/
news/temporary-protected-status-extended-haitians.
148. Aliens Act §109 (Act No. 301/2004) (Fin.), available at
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaanokset/2004/en20040301.pdf; Roberta Cohen and
Megan Bradley, Disasters and Displacement: Gaps in Protection, 1 J. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 95, 110-11 (2010).
149. ROGER ZETTER, REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE, PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTALLY
DISPLACED PEOPLE: DEVELOPING THE CAPACITY OF LEGAL AND NORMATIVE
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a status has been discussed, there is no commonly accepted
definition of the term. The United Nations Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
(“UNHCR Handbook”) states that the traditional definition
“rules out . . . victims of . . . natural disaster . . . [from
attaining refugee status], unless they also have wellfounded fear of persecution for one of . . . [the criteria in the
Refugee Convention].”150 Further, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the Refugee Convention
(the international convention that directly addresses this
issue) do not recognize the status of environmental
refugee.151 Thus, an argument could be made that
environmental refugee is not a status officially recognized
by international law, and as such, should not be one
afforded to victims of natural disasters who do not
otherwise qualify under the traditional refugee definition.
However, while the expanded definition of a refugee may
not rise to the level of custom, it has been implemented in
enough states globally to be considered state practice.152 As
the International Court of Justice utilizes state practice as a
method by which it renders its decisions,153 it is a persuasive
argument that the environmental refugee classification can
and should be applied by the international community.

FRAMEWORKS 16 (2011); Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a
Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 363 (2009).
150. U.N. Human Rights Comm’n [UNHCR], Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc.
HCR/IP/4?Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41. Several states, including
Australia and New Zealand have started to accept environmental refugees. See
Eun Jung Cahill Che, Tuvalu: First Casualty of Climate Change, JAPAN TIMES,
Aug. 26, 2001, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2001/08/26/commentary/
tuvalu-first-casualty-of-climate-change (“The Tuvaluan people need to build new
lives in a new land. Australia and New Zealand have begun to take in
environmental refugees, but they will have to adjust to the cultures that will
surround them.”).
153. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38.1.b.
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The
third
and
final
classification
for
the
environmentally affected is that of stateless persons. To
qualify for protection under Article 1(1) of the Convention
Relating to the Protection of Stateless Persons, a person
must no longer be “considered as a national by any [s]tate
under the operation of its law.”154 Under this convention,
states must grant those stateless persons the “same
treatment as is accorded to aliens.”155
There are two types of statelessness: de jure and de
facto.156 In defining these terms, the United Nation’s High
Commissioner for Refugees has determined that “refugees
who do not have a nationality at all are ‘de jure stateless,’
whereas refugees who do have a nationality are ‘de facto
stateless.’”157 Thus, in the case of nationals displaced by
climate change, de facto stateless is the only applicable
category. If these people have been rendered de facto
stateless, in that a state has lost its claim to statehood
recognition and is no longer a state, then the state lacks
standing in the International Court of Justice and cannot
bring any claims with respect to its displaced citizens.158
This could also potentially create many problems if these
people are not afforded the appropriate treatment.159 If these
people are precluded from asserting claims in the
international courts and their state no longer exists, they
could be precluded from receiving any type of relief from the
justice system. Moreover, if these people suffer human
rights abuses it would be impossible to tell if they would be
able to have their voices heard in any international forum,

154. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
art. 1.1, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960).
155. Id. art. 7, at 138.
156. BROWNLIE, supra note 50, at 418.
157. Hugh Massey, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Div. of Int’l Prot.,
UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness, at i, LPPR/2010/01 (Apr. 2010).
158. See supra text accompanying note 19 (arguing the International Court of
Justice lacks jurisdiction if a state loses its recognition).
159. See discussion infra Part III.
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as only states are allowed to be parties within the United
Nations.160
Despite the many and varied categories that these
people could satisfy, it is possible that these displaced
persons will be denied refugee status, or any other of the
potential protected statuses, based on the circumstances of
their arrival into their new homelands. If foreign
governments arbitrarily brand them as criminals for
violating domestic immigration laws, or do not provide them
any additional protections,161 this would violate many states’
treaty obligations under the Refugee Convention.162 It would
also violate state practice.
Thus, the most logical classification for these people to
receive would be that of environmental refugee. Though it is
not a status that is codified in any current international
laws, it is strongly encouraged by many scholars. But even
if the international community does not find this category
classification persuasive, these people could possibly still
qualify as traditional refugees or stateless persons.
III. TREATMENT OF THE AFFECTED PEOPLE
Some of the protected status classifications discussed
above afford the affected people additional protections.
Regardless of the status these people are afforded, all people
have certain non-derogable rights.163 Those rights include
the right to: (1) be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment;164 (2) be free from arbitrary arrest, detention, or
exile;165 and (3) leave any country and to return to their own
country.166 Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil
160. U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1 (“Membership in the United Nations is open
to . . . states . . . .”).
161. See discussion infra Part III.
162. Refugee Convention, supra note 121.
163. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(iii) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
164. Id. art. 5.
165. Id. art. 9.
166. Id. art. 13.2.
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and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) permits derogation from
certain human rights for reasons of national security.167 As
noted by the International Commission of Jurists, “[a]ny
specific derogation measures taken pursuant to ICCPR
article 4 . . . must be necessary and proportionate to real
and demonstrable threats . . . that give rise to the
emergency situation.”168
Cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment includes: (1)
subjecting persons to severe mental pain and suffering;169 (2)
keeping prisoners in overcrowded facilities;170 (3) denying
them adequate food and water;171 and (4) failing to provide
adequate medical services.172 In Massiotti v. Uruguay, a
political prisoner was kept in an overcrowded and
unsanitary prison, and given inadequate food.173 The
Human Rights Committee found that such conditions
violated “articles 7 and 10(1) [of the ICCPR], because the
conditions of . . . imprisonment amounted to inhuman
treatment.”174 Similarly, in Williams v. Jamaica, an inmate
with documented mental health issues, who did not receive
adequate medical care, was subjected to inhuman treatment
167. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 163 (1993) (reasoning that due to an influx of Haitians, the
temporary facilities at Guantanamo Bay were full and could house no more
people. As a result, the U.S. could no longer “protect [its] borders and offer the
Haitians [housing]”) (emphasis in original).
168. INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS [ICJ], ICJ SUBMISSION TO THE WORKING GROUP ON
ARBITRARY DETENTION 14(2012), available at http://icj:wpengine.netdnacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Submission-working-Group-detentionanalysis-brief-2012.pdf.
169. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Finalized Draft Text of
the Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(e), (k), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov.
2, 2000).
170. Massiotti v. Uru., No. R.6/25, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., 37th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/37/40, ¶¶1.2-1.3, at 187-88 (1982).
171. Id. at 188, 191; Mika Miha v. Eq. Guinea, U.N Human Rights Comm.,
Commc’n No 414/1990, ¶¶ 2.4-2.5, 6.4, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990 (1994).
172. Williams v. Jam., U.N Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 609/1995, ¶¶
3.1-3.4, 6.3-6.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/609/1995 (1997).
173. Massiotti, U.N. Doc. No. A/37/40, ¶¶ 1.2-1.3, 11, at 187-88, 191.
174. Id. ¶13, at 191.
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and not treated with “respect for the inherent dignity of his
person,” in contravention of articles 7 and 10(1) of the
ICCPR.175 Finally, it was found in Mika Miha v. Equatorial
Guinea that a prisoner deprived of food and water, and
denied medical attention, was subjected to cruel and
inhuman treatment in violation of the same articles.176
The Univeral Declaration of Human Rights and the
ICCPR both forbid arbitrary detention.177 Detention is
arbitrary if it is without grounds or lawful procedure.178
Lawful procedure includes the right to: (1) an effective
remedy;179 (2) a fair and public hearing in the determination
of rights and obligations of any criminal charge;180 and
(3) the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.181 No
state may detain an alien without grounds,182 or arrest an
alien without notice of the reasons for the arrest and the
charges against him or her.183
Regardless of the grounds for their detention, detained
persons have the right to have their cases heard at trial.184
The ICCPR requires individuals charged with crimes be
afforded certain rights, including: (1) a presumption of
innocence;185 (2) adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of a defense;186 (3) the right to be tried without
175. Williams, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/609/1995, ¶ 6.5.
176. Mika Miha, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990, ¶ 6.4.
177. UDHR, supra note 163, art. 9; ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 9.1.
178. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 9.1.
179. UDHR, supra note 163, art. 8.
180. Id. art. 10.
181. Id. art. 11.1.
182. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 9.1.
183. Id. art. 9.2.
184. Id. arts. 9.3-9.4; Human Rights Comm., 82nd Sess., Concluding
Observations: Morocco, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/82/MAR, ¶ 15 (Dec. 1, 2004)
[hereinafter Concluding Observations: Morocco]; Zadyvdas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 690 (2001); Sextus v. Trin. & Tobago, U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Commc’n No. 818/1998, ¶¶ 7.2-7.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998 (2001).
185. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 14.2.
186. Id. art. 14.3.b.
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undue delay;187 and (4) the right to examine the witnesses.188
The Human Rights Committee noted that even forty-eight
hours is too long a delay to before bringing an accused party
before a judge.189 Additionally, a twenty-two month
detention before trial, absent extreme circumstance, is
undue delay.190
The ICCPR requires access to an effective remedy
before the law.191 To be effective, the authority must be
competent to hear the case and to provide judicial remedy.192
Moreover, a state may not detain aliens prior to expulsion
without appropriate process of law, even in the case of
illegal entry.193 States are required to notify detained aliens
of the grounds for detention and expulsion if applicable, and
must properly treat those individuals during their
detention.194 In the Ahmadou case, the failure to notify an
alien of the grounds for his 66-day detention was held to
violate the ICCPR.195 This Court held that an alien’s human
rights are violated when he is held or expelled without
notice; especially when mistreated in detention.196 These
people are entitled to deferential status, whether refugee or
otherwise, because they fled a natural disaster which posed
a threat to their life and welfare.
No person shall be arbitrarily denied the right to enter
his or her own country.197 This right is broad, and turns on

187. Id. art. 14.3.c.
188. Id. art. 14.3.e.
189. Concluding Observations: Morocco, supra note 184, ¶15.
190. Sextus v. Trin. & Tobago, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/818/1998, ¶ 7.2.
191. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 2.3.
192. Id.
193. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Rep. Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2010 I.C.J. 639,
¶ 77 (Nov. 30).
194. See id. ¶¶ 84, 87.
195. 2010 I.C.J. ¶¶ 59, 84.
196. Id. ¶¶ 84-87.
197. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 12.4; UDHR, supra note 163, art. 13.2.
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the individual’s definition of his or her own country.198 It
includes those seeking to acquire nationality.199 The
requirement applies to all state action; states must work to
ensure even their lawful actions do not contravene it.200
Additionally, the Convention Against Torture has now
risen to the level of customary international law as it has
eighty one signatories and over one hundred and fifty
parties.201 Thus, even if states are not a party to the
Convention Against Torture they are still forced to comply
with its codified principles.202
Thus, there are a plethora of protections provided for
affected people regardless of their status classification.
However, the best and most applicable treatment would be
that of a refugee. But, even without those additional
protections, displaced persons are afforded the right to life,
liberty, and legal remedy. While these protections are
barely adequate, they do provide some reassurance to the
people who may or may not become victims twice: first of
the environmental disasters, but second, by the
international community whose failure to take the
necessary steps to protect and classify them rendered them
stateless and homeless. The international community has
failed to recognize and appropriately remedy the current
inadequacies in its laws with respect to displaced persons.
Even in situations where people are afforded protections the
laws are slow to adjust to the needs of the times and the
bureaucracy is unnecessarily difficult. By allowing for an
expansion of the refugee definition, other states would be
compelled to act where they might otherwise be reluctant to
198. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, 67th Sess., CCPR General
Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, ¶ 20, (Nov. 2, 1999).
199. Id.
200. Id. ¶ 21.
201. Treaty Collection, UNITED NATIONS, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/View
Details.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=
en%20-%20Participants (last visited Apr. 5, 2014).
202. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that rules in a treaty can become binding on third parties
through international custom).
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help these people. Furthermore, instead of forcing
integration, these states might also be more willing to cede
or lease land to the states in need.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, status classification is an important, and
often overlooked, issue in international law. In an attempt
to streamline and simplify classification efforts, legal
scholars have overlooked certain scenarios that, while
previously seeming unlikely, have presented themselves
through climate change. By properly classifying states, the
international community can necessarily ensure the
continuation of an entire people and prevent their
extinction. The international community is woefully
unprepared, as is evidenced by the current formulations of
the requisite conventions, declarations, and treaties for the
mass influx of persons displaced by climate change. At
present, there is no mechanism by which these people can
be protected or classified and their states objectively
measured. By integrating the Constitutive Theory into the
Declarative Theory as a fifth factor for determining
statehood, the international community could highlight
each theory’s strengths and minimize the weaknesses.
Further, following this method would protect persons from
being rendered stateless.
Likewise, by adopting the environmental refugee
concept on a grander scale, displaced persons would be
accorded additional protections that might otherwise be
denied them. These additional protections would allow for
them to resettle in new locations, or, if their states of origin
were ever to remerge, be allowed to return home. This
would also allow these people to have a remedy before the
law.
Overall, the international community and individual
states are not taking responsibility for their actions. States
such as the United States have such large and expansive
territories that even if they lose miles of coastline, the
majority of their people will not be displaced. More to the
point, even those people who are displaced will have
adequate territory within the United States upon which to
resettle. However, most states which will be the most

2014]

A MODERN ATLANTIS

785

harmfully impacted by the negative effects of climate
change and global warming will not be so fortunate. Some
small island states are already seeking out new homeland
in anticipation of the devastation of their territory. These
small island states might be rendered permanently
submerged due to the rising sea levels. Accordingly, those
citizens will be forced to relocate to new territory. Most of
these people will probably be forced into living in territories
with distinctive cultures and environments with which
these people are unfamiliar. This may lead to further
emotional trauma and discomfort among the people.
Currently, there are no treaties or requirements for
large developed states with extensive carbon emissions to
comply with the needs of their small island brethren
thousands of miles away. Since the harm is so far removed,
it is very difficult for many to visualize or understand the
impact excessive carbon emissions will have on these states
and their people. However, it is important for each state to
recognize the impact it has on the international community.
The effects of climate change are so drastic that not only
have they rendered the current laws governing statehood
inadequate; they also require a completely radicalized view
of how the global community understands statehood. Due to
globalization, the actions of one state have infinitely more
pressing ramifications than in times past. Even if the laws
are changed to address the concerns of recognizing
statehood and nationality, these modifications are only
temporary solutions. No matter how the laws are changed,
unless a powerful regulating and enforcing body is
developed to compel compliance, these states and their
peoples will be subjected to the whims of states gracious
enough to volunteer to help them. In a global community,
states are no longer able to solely protect their own selfinterest; rather, the moral responsibility to aid states
threatened with extinction must be transformed into a legal
obligation to act.

